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In Defense of Transjudicialism
I. INTRODUCTION
If there was any doubt that the Rehnquist Court would be
cowed by a GOP-led congressional attack in 2004' on the judici-
ary's power to cite foreign law, it was quashed with Roper v. Sim-
mons.2 The Court, with the exception of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, unequivocally recognized the ju-
dicial propriety of observing foreign and international law in ren-
dering its opinion on the juvenile death penalty.' In doing so, the
Court continued a long tradition of citing foreign law dating back
to the Declaration of Independence.4 Despite historical support for
such references, Republicans lost no time in renewing their chal-
lenge to the practice of using foreign law via the "Constitution
Restoration Act of 2005" (hereinafter the "Act").'
This Act is a metaphor for a host of ancient fears, from counter-
majoritarianism' to xenophobia. But even with newcomer Chief
Justice Roberts and the retirement of Justice O'Connor, a plural-
ity would likely continue such references to foreign law. Coined
"transjudicialism" by Justice O'Connor,7 this brand of judicial
1. S. 2323, 108th Cong. § 201 (2004), Interpretation of the Constitution.
2. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
3. Roper, 125 S. Ct. 1183 at 1200.
4. 1 Stat. 1 (1776) ("a decent respect to the opinions of mankind"). See also Brief for
Former U.S. Diplomats Morton Abramowitz, Stephen W. Bosworth, Stuart E. Eizenstat,
John C. Kornblum, Phyllis E. Oakley, Thomas R. Pickering, Felix G. Rohatyn, J. Stapleton
Roy, and Frank G. Wisner in Support of Respondent as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents at 27, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-633) (hereinafter "Brief for
Former U.S. Diplomats as Amici Curiae").
5. H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005):
In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United States, a court of
the United States may not rely upon any constitution, law, administrative rule,
Executive order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of an
foreign state or international organization or agency, other than English con-
stitutional and common law up to the time of the adoption of the Constitution
of the United States.
Id.
6. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (The Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Inc. 1962). Counter-majoritarianism has been defined as "the tension between judicial
review and the democratic process." Barry Freidman, The History of the Countermajori-
tarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334
(1998).
7. Luiza Ch. Savage, A Conservative Movement Says the Supreme Court Is Getting Too
Chummy With Foreigners, The Boston Globe, Mar. 20, 2005, available at
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openness to foreign legal trends has only been narrowly applied by
this Court. Not only should this dispel any apprehension for loss
of sovereignty, but such appreciation for "evolving standards of
decency"8 could also help the United States avoid becoming what
some fear we are already: a "global pariah."9
This comment will examine how the Court used international
law in Roper, followed by a similar analysis of Atkins, ° Lawrence,"
and Bollinger," the three cases that brought on the 2004 congres-
sional firestorm. A brief historical survey of references by the
Court to international law will show that such interpretive tools
are far from new or illegitimate. Then, the Capitol Hill's reaction
and Justice Scalia's dissent in Roper will explain the objections to
the Court's usage of foreign sources. But an examination of the
international perspective that follows will shed light on the jus-
tice, even necessity, of our Supreme Court recognizing interna-
tional customary law and employing constitutional comparativ-
ism."3 Finally, a defense to Justice Scalia's objections and Con-
gress's anxieties will be articulated. Like the debate between sci-
entism and romanticism, 4 it is "much ado about nothing," 5 and in
the end, "the judgment of the Court" is inescapable."
http://www.boston.com.
8. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 101 (1958). "The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." Id.
9. Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats at 20, Roper (No. 03-633).
10. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
11. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
13. See generally Andrea Bianchi, International Law and U.S. Courts: The Myth of
Lohengrin Revisited, EUR. J. INT L L. 15, 751-781 (2004).
14. LOYD W. MATSON, THE BROKEN IMAGE - MAN, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY (Anchor
Books 1966) (1964). "When man is the subject, the proper understanding of science leads
unmistakably to the science of understanding." Id. at 247.
15. Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law:
Hearing on H. R. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 108th Cong. 87 (2004) (statement of Jerrold Nadler, D. NY, to Ms. Vicki Jackson,
Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center). See also Tony Mauro, U.S. Supreme Court vs.
The World, USA Today, June 19, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-06-19-court-edit-x.htm#?POE=click-refer
(quoting J. Sandra Day O'Conner describing the controversy as "much ado about nothing").
16. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 236 (quoting J. Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezey v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255, 266-67 (1957)):
To be sure, this a conclusion based on a judicial judgment in balancing two con-
tending principles - the right of a citizen to political privacy, as protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right of the State to self-protection. And
striking the balance implies the exercise of judgment. This is the inescapable
judicial task in giving substantive content, legally enforced to the Due Process
Clause, and it is a task ultimately committed to this Court. It must not be an
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II. ROPER V. SIMMONS: INTERPRETING THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT IN LIGHT OF MATURING
VALUES OF CIVILIZED SOCIETY
The Court granted certiorari to reconsider whether capital pun-
ishment of a juvenile, who had been over fifteen but less than
eighteen years of age when the crime was committed, violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." The facts in this case were
tragic and inflammatory, but the Court found that the death pen-
alty in such a case is barred by the Constitution as being "cruel
and unusual punishment."18 At seventeen, the defendant Sim-
mons conspired with two friends to burglarize the home of the fe-
male victim. Part of the plan was to tie her up and throw her off a
bridge, causing her to either suffocate beneath a full face of duct
tape or drown helplessly in the water. During the commission of
this heinous act, Simmons had the audacity to assure his con-
spirators that they could "get away with it" because they were mi-
nors.19
After establishing the constitutional precepts of the Eighth
Amendment, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the Court was
about to overturn a prior holding based on a change in the "evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."2" Emphasizing that the Constitution must be read with
regard to "history, tradition, and precedent,"2 he affirmed that the
legitimacy of taking into consideration changing mores was estab-
lished with the 1958 case, Trop v. Dulles.22 In Trop, the message
was quite clear: "The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
exercise of whim or will. It must be an overriding judgment founded on some-
thing much deeper and more justifiable than personal preference. As far as it
lies within human limitations, it must be an impersonal judgment. It must
rest on fundamental presuppositions rooted in history to which widespread ac-
ceptance may fairly be attributed. Such a judgment must be arrived at in a
spirit of humility when it counters the judgment of the State's highest court.
But, in the end, judgment cannot be escaped - the judgment of this Court.
Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17. Roper over-turned Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). See also Mark Han-
sen, Will Youth be Served?, ABA JOURNAL, May 2005, at 18.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
19. Roperv. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1187-88 (2005).
20. Id. at 1190 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
21. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190.
22. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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a maturing society."23 Justice Kennedy further noted that the
Court had similarly changed its stance on capital punishment for
offenders under sixteen in the 1988 case, Thompson v. Okla-
homa.24 In that case, the Court ruled that the execution of such
offenders "would offend civilized standards of decency" held "by
other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the
leading members of the Western European community."25
Adopting the reasoning of the very case they were over-turning,
the Court argued that the national consensus of Stanford v. Ken-
tucky in favor of executing juveniles no longer existed.26 Implicit
in referencing a "national consensus" is the application of a tem-
poral value to jurisprudence. This point was not lost on Justice
Kennedy. Thus, the Court said, if a national consensus was im-
portant in Stanford, it is again important in Roper, and this con-
sensus has now changed. Similarly, the Court pointed to the rea-
soning of Penry v. Lynaugh,27 decided on the same day as Stan-
ford. There was no national consensus against executing the men-
tally retarded, the Court held in Penry, and thus such practice
could not be held as cruel and unusual.28 The salient point was,
however, that the Court countenanced a national consensus at all.
The significance of the concept of national consensus and its
corollary that opinion can change with the times becomes appar-
ent when the Court makes reference to international law.29 The
Court found it significant that other nations, individually and col-
lectively, have a consensus similar to its opinion on the unconsti-
tutionality of executing minors. After citing other reasons why
juvenile capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment, ° the
Court directed its attention globally, stating that "[olur determi-
nation that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for
offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the
United States is the only country in the world that continues to
give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty."' The Court
was quick to add, however, that "[t]his reality does not become
23. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
24. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
25. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
26. 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989).
27. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
28. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
29. See generally Mark E. Wojcik, When Can the Supreme Court Invoke International
Law in Support of a Holding?, INT'L LAW NEWS, Spring 2005, at 27.
30. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194-98.
31. Id. at 1198.
Vol. 44
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controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment
remains our responsibility."
32
Justice Kennedy continued by reciting a litany of cases in which
the Court had previously referenced "laws of other countries,'
and then outlined international covenants pertinent to this case.
The first example was Article 37 of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child,34 which, the Court noted, had been
ratified by every country in the world except the United States
and Somalia.35 The Court pointed out that "[parallel prohibitions
are contained in other significant international covenants," 6 citing
international treaties and conventions supporting the ban against
such executions. Illustrating that the United States "stands alone
in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death pen-
alty,"37 the Court emphasized that only seven countries other than
the United States have carried out such executions since 1990:
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and China. "Since then," Justice Kennedy
noted, "each of these countries has either abolished punishment
for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice." 8
The Court stressed in particular that the United Kingdom had
abolished capital punishment for juveniles even earlier than other
nations, underlining the fact that the Amendment in question had
origins in English law: "The United Kingdom's experience bears
particular relevance here in light of the historic ties between our
countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment's own origins.
The Amendment was modeled on a parallel provision in the Eng-
lish Declaration of Rights of 1689 . . . ."' Justice Kennedy also
found support for the Court's opinion in the Brief for Human
Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al., couched
in the introductory statement that "[iit is proper that we acknowl-
edge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the
juvenile death penalty."' Justice Kennedy added somewhat de-
32. Id.
33. Id. (A survey of such cases will follow later in this Comment).
34. G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, Art. 37, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (1989) United Nations:
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M.
1448, 1468-1479 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).





40. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200.
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fensively: "The opinion of the world community, while not control-
ling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirma-
tion for our own conclusions." 1
Anticipating another congressional onslaught of criticism for cit-
ing foreign law, the opinion ended with an extravagant justifica-
tion:
Over time, from one generation to the next, the Constitu-
tion has come to earn the high respect and even, as Madi-
son dared to hope, the veneration of the American people.
See The Federalist No. 49, p 314 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
The document sets forth, and rests upon, innovative prin-
ciples original to the American experience, such as feder-
alism; a proven balance in political mechanisms through
separation of powers; specific guarantees for the accused
in criminal cases; and broad provisions to secure individ-
ual freedom and preserve human dignity. These doctrines
and guarantees are central to the American experience
and remain essential to our present-day self-definition
and national identity. Not the least of the reasons we
honor the Constitution, then, is because we know it to be
our own. It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution
or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express
affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other na-
tions and peoples simply underscores the centrality of
those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.42
Justice O'Connor dissented only in that she did not recognize
that a national consensus exists against the juvenile death pen-
alty,43 not in the affirmative value of foreign law. In fact, she took
pains to support her brethren in the use of such sources of law:
I disagree with Justice Scalia's contention that foreign
and international law have no place in our Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. Over the course of nearly half
a century, the Court has consistently referred to foreign
and international law as relevant to its assessment of
evolving standards of decency. This inquiry reflects the
special character of the Eighth Amendment, which, as
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Vol. 44
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the Court has long held, draws its meaning directly from
the maturing value of civilized society. Obviously, Ameri-
can law is distinctive in many respects, not least where
the specific provisions of our Constitution and the history
of its exposition so dictate. But this Nation's evolving
understanding of human dignity certainly is neither
wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the
values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, we
should not be surprised to find congruence between do-
mestic and international values, especially where the in-
ternational community has reached clear agreement -
expressed in international law or in the domestic laws of
individual countries - that a particular form of punish-
ment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights. At
least, the existence of an international consensus of this
nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a con-
sonant and genuine American consensus. The instant
case presents no such domestic consensus, however, and
the recent emergence of an otherwise global consensus
does not alter that basic fact."'
III. ATKINS, LAWRENCE, AND BOLLINGER:
JUDICIAL LIGHTNING RODS
Atkins,' decided in 2002, and Lawrence," decided in 2003, drew
the attention of several Senators such that a bill forerunner to the
current "Constitution Restoration Act" was introduced.47 Grutter
v. Bollinger was similarly lionized.48 Aside from the holdings
themselves, it is worth examining the language that caused such
uproar, and the scope to which it was applied. In Atkins, it is so
brief and innocuous that to find fault with it is absurd.
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion in Atkins that, like Roper, in-
volved Eighth Amendment interpretation with regard to the death
penalty (of the mentally retarded). The Supreme Court of Virginia
44. Id. at 1215-16 (internal citations omitted).
45. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). See also Tim Wu, Foreign Exchange -
Should the Supreme Court Care What Other Countries Think?, (April 9, 2004), available at
Slate, httpJ/slate.msn.com/id/2098559/.
46. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
47. S. 2323 108th Cong. § 201 (Interpretation of the Constitution (2004)).
48. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). See also Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Inter-
pretation of American Law: Hearing on H. Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. J. Res. 568, 108th Cong. 9 (2004).
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had declined to commute the death sentence "merely because of
his [Atkins'] IQ score.'4 9 Invoking the Trop language of "evolving
standards,"" Stevens approached the issue of international stan-
dards51 with the initial argument that decisions, in order to be
just, must be rendered ever mindful of the temporal setting of the
case.52 In searching for a national consensus against executing the
mentally retarded, 3 he explained the next step in the Court's rea-
soning by stating the following: "Guided by our approach in these
cases, we shall first review the judgment of legislatures that have
addressed the suitability of imposing the death penalty on the
mentally retarded and then consider reasons for agreeing or dis-
agreeing with their judgment."5 4 Included in this 'next step' is ref-
erence, in a footnote, to "diverse religious communities in the
United States, reflecting Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist
traditions" and "the world community" in general.55
A year later, Justice Kennedy penned the opinion in Lawrence,
where the issue was whether Texas sodomy laws violated equal
protection and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,56 and whether Bowers v. Hardwick57 should then be over-
ruled. Arguing that the reasoning in Bowers was flawed, the
Court discussed at length whether the alleged international con-
sensus against sodomy actually existed at the time Bowers was
decided.58 It is ironic to observe that Chief Justice Burger, concur-
ring in Bowers, freely discussed international law as a reason
49. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (2000), quoted in Atkins, 536 U.S. at
310.
50. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
51. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
52. Id. at 311. "A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards
that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the 'Bloody Assizes' or when the
Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail." Id.
53. Id. at 313.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 316 n.21. The reference is quoted in its entirety below:
In addition, representatives of widely diverse religious communities in the
United States, reflecting Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist traditions,
have filed an amicus curiae brief explaining that even though their views about
the death penalty differ, they all "share a conviction that the execution of per-
sons with mental retardation cannot be morally justified." Moreover, within
the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed
by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved of.
Id.
56. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
57. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
58. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73.
Vol. 44
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against protecting sodomy, with Justice Rehnquist joining in the
majority opinion without reservation.59
The difference between Lawrence and Atkins as to the quantity
and scope of reference to international law is striking." In Law-
rence, British law and decisional law from the European Court of
Human Rights were referenced, as was the law of "other na-
tions."6 Could this be Justice Kennedy's volley back to Justice
Scalia's overblown objection in Atkins?6 In any case, Justice Ken-
nedy confined his implication of international law to a simple re-
buttal to Justice Burger's concurrence in Bowers. His only point
with regard to Bowers and foreign sources was that it was flawed
in its unspecified usage of international law. He called attention
to "[tihe sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the his-
tory of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and
ethical standards" and countered with similar international evi-
dence in contradiction. 3 Again, no one in Bowers took issue with
Burger's concurrence invoking international law. There were dis-
agreements in the opinion as to the value of the particular law,
but not to the invocation itself.64 Not until Atkins was such com-
parativism considered unusual.
Before illustrating that proposition, a brief assessment of Grut-
ter v. Bollinger is required to complete the trio of cases decried by
the GOP. 5 At issue were the University of Michigan Law School's
admissions policies, designed to achieve ethnic and racial diver-
sity. In finding that the school's practices did not infringe on the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause, Justice Gins-
burg concurred with Justice O'Connor. Justice Ginsburg cited
59. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986).
60. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73, 576.
61. Id.
62. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48. Scalia states:
But the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate "national consen-
sus" must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the views of
assorted professionals and religious organizations, members of the so-called
"world community," and respondents to opinion polls. I agree with the Chief
Justice that the views of professional and religious organizations and the re-
sults of opinion polls are irrelevant. Equally irrelevant are the practices of the
"world community," whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those
of our people.
Id. (internal citations and footnotes omitted). (Author's note: if our opinion polls are
equally irrelevant, where is the value to the Court of the "notions of justice ... of our peo-
ple"?).
63. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73.
64. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 n.5, 211-12.
65. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women as
evidence that the holding was in accordance with "the interna-
tional understanding of the office of affirmative action."66
The pattern that seems to emerge is that these decisions are so-
cially liberal in nature. Since the language used does not imply
that the Court is bound by international decisions or law, but is
only looking outward to view what the rest of the world is doing,
one must wonder if the real issue is not the invocation of interna-
tional law, but the decision itself, which is (infuriatingly) sup-
ported by international norms.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COURT'S HISTORICAL
USAGE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
An excellent starting point for a scholarly study of precedent in
the use of international law for constitutional reasoning are the
Briefs of Amici Curiae to Roper." Amnesty International's (et. al.)
Amici Curiae Brief frames the issue by quoting the Court's elo-
quence in 1884:
The constitution of the United States was ordained, it is
true by the descendents of Englishmen, who inherited the
traditions of the English law and history; but it was made
for an undefined and expanding future, and for a people
gathered, and to be gathered, from many nations and of
many tongues; and while we take just pride in the princi-
ples and institutions of the common law, we are not to
forget that in lands where other systems of jurisprudence
prevail, the ideas and processes of civil justice are also
not unknown. . . . There is nothing in Magna Carta,
66. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 342 (citing Annex to G. A. Res. 2106, 20 U. N. GAOR Res.
Supp (No. 14) 47, U. N. Doc. A/6014, Art. 2(2) (1965), and Annex to G. A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.
N. GAOR Res. Supp (No. 46) 194, U. N. Doc. A/34/46, Art. 4(1) (1979), respectively).
67. Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats as Amici Curiae at 26-29, Roper v. Simmons, 125
S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief of Amici Curiae President James Earl Carter, Jr.,
President Willem De Klerk, President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, President Oscar
Arias Sanchez, President Lech Walesa, Shirin Ebadi, Adolfo Perez Esquivel, The Dalai
Lama, Mairead Corrigan Maguire, Dr. Joseph Rotblat, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Betty
Williams, Jody Williams, American Friends Service Committee, Amnesty International,
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and the Pugwash Conferences
on Science and World Affairs (Nobel Prize Laureates) as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents at 20-26, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-633) (hereinafter "Brief
for Amnesty International as Amici Curiae").
Vol. 44102
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rightly construed as a broad charter of public right and
law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems
and of every age; and as it was the characteristic princi-
ple of the common law to draw its inspiration from every
fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources
of its supply have been exhausted.68
Thus, in recognizing that our Constitution originated from for-
eign sources, the Court at that time freed itself to look beyond our
borders for wisdom, recognizing change and "evolving standards of
decency."
In making its point, Amnesty International's Amici Curiae Brief
further elaborates on the genesis of the phrase, "cruel and unusual
punishment," noting that it originated from the English Declara-
tion of Rights of 1689 and the Magna Carta.69 However, the most
beautiful phrasing in support of the Court's duty to be aware of
systems outside its own comes from Weems v. United States in
1910:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions
and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
it birth. This is particularly true of constitutions. They
are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing
occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice
Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly as
human institutions can approach it." The future is their
care, and provision for events of good and bad tendencies
of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a
constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only
of what has been, but of what may be.7"
In considering the judicial power to consider foreign law, it is
worth noting that the Court has jurisdiction over matters arising
under treaties.7' By corollary, the Court must therefore be aware
68. Brief for Amnesty International as Amici Curiae, supra note 67, at 21 (quoting
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884)).
69. Id. at 22.
70. Id. at 22-23 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
71. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also Brief for Amnesty International as Amici Curiae at
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ofjus cogens,72 mandatory norms of international law.73 By defini-
tion, norms change and evolve with society.74 Should the Court
only apply current thinking to international cases, while depriving
domestic matters of their most enlightened reasoning? This point
is enunciated by Jules Lobel:
Absent an International consensus that a given principle
is so fundamental as to allow no derogation, the political
branches my act free of judicial restraint. When such a
fundamental norm is implicated, however, both the in-
ternational and domestic legal orders would generally re-
quire domestic court review of the actions of the political
branches. In such a situation, the proper role of the
courts is to determine and to apply common international
standards .... Where fundamental norms limit the dis-
cretion of the political branches, there should be a strong
presumption of judicial reviewability.75
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to give more than a cur-
sory glance at the commonly cited cases wherein the Court relied,
to varying extents, upon international law. Beginning chronologi-
cally, in Henfield's Case of 1793, Thomas Jefferson defines the
laws of the United States as "1st All treaties made under the au-
thority of the United States; 2d. The laws of nations. 3dly. The
Constitution, and statutes of the United States."76
In another very early case, the Court drew on international
definitions of piracy: "What the law of nations on this subject is,
may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing pro-
fessedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of na-
72. jus cogens: "A mandatory norm of general international law from which no two or
more nations may exempt themselves or release one another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
864 (7th ed. 1999).
73. Brief for Amnesty International as Amici Curiae, supra note 67, at 20.
74. Norm: "A model or standard accepted (voluntarily or involuntarily) by society or
other large group, against which society judges someone or something ... ." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1083 (7th ed. 1999).
75. Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy
and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1166-67 (1985). See also Brief for Amnesty
International as Amici Curiae, supra note 67, at 5 n.12.
76. 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1101 (1793) (emphasis added). See also Joan L. Larsen, Importing
Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization: Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use
of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.
J. 1283, 1313-14 (2004) (author Larsen argues that the way international law was used
does not support the thesis that early courts relied on international law).
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tions ... ."77 The landmark case, Pennoyer v. Neff, contains many
references to English decisional law, important as "expressions of
the opinion of eminent jurists."78 Similarly, the Court in Kilbourn
v. Thompson looked to English history and decisional law at
length.79 Although it was an international claim for debts origi-
nating in France, the Court made full use of English law in Hilton
v. Guyot. °
In a more decidedly domestic case, references were made to
English, Irish, Scottish, Phillipino, and Canadian law in Culombe
v. Connecticut.1 Coker v. Georgia, another Eighth Amendment
capital punishment case, is often cited by those who support the
use of foreign sources.82 The Court said, "We observe that in the
light of the legislative decisions in almost all of the States and in
most of the countries around the world, it would be difficult to
support a claim that the death penalty for rape is an indispensa-
ble part of the States' criminal justice system."3
Enmund v. Florida followed, pertaining to the same issue,
(death penalty), and the Court again referenced international law:
"It is thus worth noting that the doctrine of felony murder has
been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Can-
ada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is un-
known in continental Europe."84 Other decisions followed, 5 most
notably being, (excluding those discussed originally), Foster v.
Florida.86 In denying certiorari, Justice Thomas responded to Jus-
tice Breyer's statement that a number of countries, including Ja-
maica, have found cruelty in undue delay between sentencing and
execution.87 Noting, (somewhat callously), that the "[p]etitioner
77. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160 (1820). See also Brief for Former U.S.
Diplomats as Amici Curiae, supra note 67, at 6 n.5.
78. 95 U.S. 714, 725 (1878). See also Wu, supra note 45.
79. 103 U.S. 168, 183-89 (1881) (false imprisonment).
80. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). See also Bianchi, supra note 13, at 754 n.11.
81. 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (prosecution of defendant with mental age of a nine year-old for
murder).
82. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape).
83. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
84. 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (death penalty for accomplice).
85. Cf Nixon v. Shrink, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (campaign financing); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (assisted suicide); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997)
(Line Item Veto Act); Mcintyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (anonymous campaign litera-
ture); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (seventeen year-old defendant and capital
punishment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (fifteen year-old defendant and
capital punishment).
86. 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (delay in administration of death penalty).
87. Foster, 537 U.S. at 991.
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could long ago have ended his 'anxieties and uncertainties,' by
submitting to what the people of Florida have deemed him to de-
serve: execution,"8 Justice Thomas reveals his disregard for for-
eign law: "While Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider
the actions of other nations on any issue it likes, this Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign
moods, fads or fashions on Americans." 9
V. FOREIGN MOODS, FADS AND FASHIONS: MEANINGLESS DICTA?
JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
As seen above, detractors to such foreign references can be
somewhat harsh in their rhetoric. Justice Scalia's dissent in Law-
rence is an infamous example. "The Court's discussion of these
foreign views, (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have
retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is therefore meaning-
less dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this Court... should
not impose foreign moods, fads or fashions on Americans.'"9" This,
like the usage of foreign law in Supreme Court decisions, is noth-
ing new. Patrick Henry, arguing for a Bill of Rights, said:
What has distinguished our ancestors? - That they
would not admit torturers, or cruel and barbarous pun-
ishment. But [in the absence of a Bill of Rights] Congress
may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference
to that of the common law. They may introduce the prac-
tice of France, Spain, and Germany - of torturing, to ex-
tort a confession of the crime. They will say that they
might as well draw examples from those countries as
from Great Britain .... We are then lost and undone.91
Centuries later, Congress echoes the same fears. This test is
from Congressman Feeney's web page:
Congressmen Feeney and Goodlatte have authored the
Reaffirming American Independence Resolution instruct-
ing the federal courts to remember that their role is in-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 990 n.*. See also Bianchi, supra note 13, at 773.
90. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting, paraphrasing Thomas, J.).
91. Patrick Henry, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, 447-48 (2d ed. 1891), quoted in Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, at 581-82 n.23 (1961).
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terpreting US law, not importing foreign laws - a clear
violation of the separation of powers.
America's sovereignty and the integrity of our legal proc-
ess are threatened by a jurisprudence predicated upon
laws and judicial decisions alien to our Constitution and
our system of self-government. The American people
have not consented to being ruled by foreign powers or
tribunals .... This resolution affirms the sense of Con-
gress that judicial decisions should not be based on any
foreign laws, court decisions, or pronouncements by for-
eign governments unless they are expressly approved by
Congress.92
And this from Representative Ted Poe:
Are our Supreme Court justices ... citing foreign courts
arbitrarily . . . only opinions that are harmonious with
their own social agendas? . .. What if a judge suddenly
decided that - in keeping with some foreign law - we
should begin cutting off the hands of common thieves?
That dog just wouldn't hunt here in America ....
Having been down in the mud, blood, and beer with real
people, I have witnessed the Constitution's impact on the
lives of Americans. I submit that looking to foreign court
decisions is as relevant as using the writings of Reader's
Digest, a Sears and Roebuck catalog, a horoscope, my
grandmother's recipe for the common cold.... ."
And finally, this from the floor of the Senate, Senator John
Cornyn, who was shocked, shocked, that the Court would be cogni-
zant of "evolving standards of decency:"
92. Congressman Tom Feeney, Representing Florida's 24th District, Should Americans
Be Governed by the Laws of Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe, or the European Union?,
http://www.house.gov/feeney/reaffirmation.htm (last visited July 20, 2005).





What I want to focus on now is the reasoning that Justice
Anthony Kennedy ... used to reach that conclusion [in
Roper v. Simmons].
First, Justice Kennedy adopted a test for determining
whether this death penalty conviction was constitutional.
The test - this ought to give you some indication of the
problems we have with the Supreme Court as a policy-
maker with no fixed standards or objective standards by
which to determine its decisions to make its judgments.
The Court embraced a test that it had adopted earlier re-
ferring to the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society." Let me repeat that.
The test they used was the "evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society."94
The transcript for the March 25, 2004 hearing on the "Appropri-
ate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American
Law" further illuminates the fears associated with this issue:95
This model in which you can have judges dialoguing with
each other and changing their national laws is something
which they find very appealing in Europe because that is
what the EU is. It's basically linked-up judges who have
established a whole new Constitution on top of the na-
tional Constitutions . .. [Down the road you're going to
have questions about what can we do in our anti-terror
efforts. I don't think we want to take construction from
European judges who have a very different view of this,
because their whole view of terror is it's something that
happens to other people and keep it away from us.9 6
Clearly there exists the counter-majoritarian fear that the sepa-
ration of powers will be violated:
Finally, I would like to challenge all of the witnesses to-
day... [in saying that] creating new law based on what
foreign countries are doing ... violates at times articles
94. Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas Floor Speech: The Judiciary,
http'//cornyn.senate.gov/record.cfin?id=236007 (4 April 2005). See also Trop, 356 U.S. 86.
95. Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, supra note 15.
96. Id. at 26-27 (Statement of Jeremy Rabkin, Professor of Government, Cornell Uni-
versity).
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[sic] I of the Constitution, because it usurps our legisla-
tive authority; violates article II, because it prohibits a
presidential veto of new law; violates article III - vio-
lates article IV with respect to guaranteeing a republican
form of government, because nobody is permitted to vote
for the justices that are making this law by referencing
foreign law; violates article V, the treaty provisions, be-
cause we end up at times basically ratifying agreements
with other countries even though neither the legislature
nor the President was involved in this new treaty; and,
finally, violates article VI, the supremacy clause.97
And if all that were not enough, current law school education
was brought into the fray:
And another thing that I am concerned about is the activ-
ism that's being taught within our law schools today, the
young people that believe that it is their job to go out and
amend this Constitution by every opportunity of litiga-
tion they have, and that kind of activism in the end tears
this Constitution asunder...."
Turning from lay opinion to the judicial dissents, an examina-
tion must be made of their demurrer. With each dissent, the
rhetoric became more heated, reaching its crescendo in Roper.
Thus, this comment will focus on Justice Scalia's dissent in that
case alone, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
joined.
In overturning Stanford, Justice Scalia questioned why no "na-
tional consensus" was found a "mere" fifteen years ago against
executing juveniles." Skeptical that a national consensus was
actually discovered by the majority, he concluded that "[tihe Court
thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation's moral standards
- and in the course of discharging that awesome responsibility
purports to take guidance from the views of foreign courts and
legislatures." ° Ratcheting up the rhetoric, he states the obvious:
"Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amend-
ment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Con-
97. Id. at 78 (Statement of Rep. Feeney). See also Bianchi, supra note 13, at 775, dis-
cussing the "counter-majoritarian difficulty."
98. Id. at 21 (Statement of Rep. Steve King, Iowa).




stitution, should be determined by the subjective views of five
Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.""'
Such language was red meat to the conservative GOP.
Justice Scalia disagreed with even the concept of a "national
consensus," and if one did in fact exist, whether it should in any
way influence the judgment of the Court.' 2 However, he reluc-
tantly acknowledged that precedent' 3 required him to consider a
"national consensus." He found insufficient indicia in that 47% of
the states were in support of the majority's holding.0 4  With no
valid consensus, then, the Court was prescribing what the moral
consensus should be, not just identifying it.' In addition, he
found fault with the "picking and choosing" that the Court did
with scientific and sociological studies: "[The Court] never ex-
plains why those particular studies are methodologically sound;
none was ever entered into evidence or tested in an adversarial
proceeding." 6 He continued: "In other words, all the Court has
done today ... is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out
its friends." 7
While at once arguing that elected representatives are better
equipped to make decisions, but a national consensus should have
no influence, Justice Scalia wasted no time in an implied criticism
of the Court for ignoring the "true" consensus in favor of the vaga-
ries of foreign law: "Though the views of our own citizens are es-
sentially irrelevant to the Court's decision today, the views of
other countries and the so-called international community take
center stage."' 8 By using the majority's international evidence to
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1217-18.
In determining that capital punishment of offenders who committed murder
before age 18 is "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment, the Court
first considers, in accordance with our modern (though in my view mistaken)
jurisprudence, whether there is a "national consensus," that laws allowing such
executions contravene our modem "standards of decency."
Id. (citations omitted).
103. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
104. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1222.
106. Id. Scalia believed:
Given the nuances of scientific methodology and conflicting views, courts .
are ill equipped to determine which view of science is the right one. Legisla-
tures "are better qualified to weigh and 'evaluate the results of statistical stud-
ies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that
is not available to the courts."
Id. at 1223 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987)).
107. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1223 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
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his advantage, Justice Scalia indicts them for violating the sepa-
ration of powers.109 He does this by passing over the international
consensus, and stressing that there was evidently no national con-
sensus as evidenced by the fact that the United States had not
ratified a particular treaty cited by the Court.
Then, not content with casting doubt on a national consensus,
Justice Scalia proceeded to impugn the international consensus,
suggesting that not all countries with laws against the juvenile
death penalty actually enforce them."' Further, he allowed that
some or most of these self-same countries have other laws on their
books that our Constitution will not countenance."' Examples
include a lack of an exclusionary rule,"2 separation between
church and state,"3 and no abortion on demand."4
In overcoming the "elephant in the living room," the fact that
our Court has often referred to English jurisprudence, Justice
Scalia assigned special license: as long as the interpretation be-
longed to past, historical tradition, the reference was legitimate.'
Anything modern carried the taint of the European Union."' One
could say that Justice Scalia was himself guilty of "picking and
choosing" at this point. He ironically concluded, "To invoke alien
109. Id. at 1226. Scalia wrote:
The Court begins by noting that "Article 37 of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990, which every country
in the world has ratified save for the United States and Somalia contains an ex-
press prohibition on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under 18." . . . I
cannot see how this evidence favors, rather than refutes, its position. That the
Senate and the President - those actors our Constitution empowers to enter
into treaties, have declined to join and ratify treaties prohibiting execution of
under-18 offenders can only suggest that our country has either not reached a
national consensus on the question, or has reached a consensus contrary to
what the Court announces.
Id.
110. Id. at 1226.
111. Id.
112. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1227.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1227-28. Scalia asserted:
The Court has, however - I think wrongly-long rejected a purely originalist
approach to our Eighth Amendment .... It is beyond comprehension why we
should look.., to a country that has developed, in the centuries since the Revo-
lutionary War-and with increasing speed since the United Kingdom's recent
submission to the jurisprudence of European courts dominated by Continental




law when it agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore it other-
wise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry."11 '
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that foreign sources were being
used "not to underscore our 'fidelity' to the Constitution," but "to
set aside the centuries-old American practice . . . of letting a jury
of 12 citizens decide whether, in the particular case, youth should
be the basis for withholding the death penalty," successfully af-
firming "the Justices' own notion of how the world ought to be...
,,118 He considered the lower court's disregard of the Supreme
Court's precedent in Stanford was analogous to what the Court
was doing here:
To allow lower courts to behave as we do, "updating" the
Eighth Amendment as needed, destroys stability and
makes our case law an unreliable basis for the designing
of laws by citizens and their representatives, and for ac-
tion by public officials. The result will be to crown arbi-
trariness with chaos."9
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Sometimes it is just inconvenient to be a super-anything; super-
model, super-star, or super-power. Whatever one does, it does not
go unnoticed. The same applies to the activities of our Supreme
Court. While the Bush Administration is busy trying to "export
democracy" around the world while simultaneously shielding itself
from "foreign fads," the sanctimoniousness of its actions are ob-
served abroad. 2 ' Bianchi summarizes the current perception:
The different nature of international law and its poten-
tially pervasive effects on domestic law are frequently a
cause for US courts to reject its proper implementation.
At the base of this attitude, which seems to be the pre-
vailing one at the moment, lies the perception that the
fundamental postulates of the domestic legal order, as
enshrined in the Constitution, cannot be altered by a
117. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1228 (Scalia, J., dissenting). (For an interesting discussion of a
rare departure from Justice Scalia's usual stance, see Bianchi, supra note 13, at 768, dis-
cussing Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2921 (1993) (Justice Scalia
advocates applying international law as opposed to U.S. law)).
118. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1229 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1230.
120. See generally Bianchi, supra note 13.
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body of law which does not exclusively emanate from the
national societal body.
121
The fact that the United States is a "dualist," viewing domestic
and international law as two separate bodies of jurisprudence,'22 is
cause for disquiet in the rest of the world. This is especially true
with regard to human rights.'23 Access to American courts via the
Alien Tort Claims Act, (ATCA)24 is highly desirable, but Bianchi
fears such access will become meaningless:
The recent doctrinal shift towards relegating customary
international law into the margins of the legal system by
denying its status as federal common law attests to the
inward-looking attitude of the US legal system at this
time and to its diffidence vis-et-vis external sources of
law-making. Should courts sanction this scholarly atti-
tude, the US legal system may become almost imperme-
able to that 'law of nations' which the framers and the
early Justices considered as part of the law of the land
and looked up to as the common legacy of civilization.'
A related issue is the non-self executing nature of some of our
treaties. 26  Echoing the counter-majoritarian fears of Congress,
the assumption that a treaty is non-self executing, (where the
treaty is silent in this regard), further isolates us diplomatically:
Recently, an attempt has been made to revise the doc-
trine of non-self-execution, primarily on the basis of his-
121. Bianchi, supra note 13, at 751.
122. See STARK'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 71-72 (1994), quoted in LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER - A PROBLEM ORIENTED
COURSEBOOK 207-08 (2nd ed. 1999).
The two principal theories are known as monism and dualism. According to
monism, international law and State law are concomitant aspects of the one
system - law in general; according to dualism, they represent two entirely dis-
tinct legal systems, international law having an intrinsically different charac-
ter from State law.
Id.
123. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 757. See also Filartiga v. Pefia Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980) (holding "that reference to international law had to be interpreted as the law stands
today and not as it was in 1789 at the time of enactment." Bianchi, supra note 13, at 757).
124. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2000). See also Bianchi, supra note 13, at 757, 777-78. ("[A]
rather unique tool for adjudicating international human rights claims.") Bianchi, supra
note 13, at 758.
125. Bianchi, supra note 13, at 757, 778-79.
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 111 (1990). See also Bianchi, supra note 13, at 760.
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torical arguments, to the effect of maintaining that
"courts should obey the presumption that when the text
of a treaty is silent, courts ought to assume that it is non-
self-executing." The argument, besides its alleged histori-
cal underpinnings, is grounded on the "'deep structural
imperatives" of the Constitution, particularly separation
of power concerns. This theory has been attacked on sev-
eral grounds and its ultimate impact on US practices is
yet to be tested. What the theory stands for, however,
can easily be accommodated within the framework of a
nationalist jurisprudence which traces the debate on self-
execution to the narrow boundaries of the constitutional
interpretation discourse, disregarding almost entirely
contemporary international policy considerations.12 '
A particularly inflammatory example was the Fourth Circuit's
decision that the Geneva Convention is non-self-executing. The
end result, (at that level), barred petitioners, accused of being "en-
emy combatants," from our domestic courts.' The question then
becomes, is Justice Scalia's brand of one-way street jurisprudence
even sustainable in this age of globalization?
VII. DEFENDING TRANSJUDICIALISM
Some would have the public believe that applying international
law to constitutional issues is a relatively new phenomenon, con-
trary to all evidence, ante.9 Rather, recent reference to interna-
tional law is more a reflection not of change in our jurisprudence,
but of change in the world around us. This is a world of constant
communication, thanks to innovations like the Internet, twenty-
127. Bianchi, supra note 13, at 760. See also John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitu-
tion: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1955 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1824 (1998).
128. Bianchi, supra note 13, at 764. See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d. 450 (4th Cir.
2003) (The court held that there was no procedural right to habeas corpus) (vacated by
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, remanded by Handi v. Rumsfeld, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir.
2004)).
129. Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization": Law-
rence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L. 1283, 1284 (2004) ("Lawrence may have added a
spark to a quieter revolution - a revolution in constitutional interpretation that has been
stirring, largely unnoticed, for years. The revolution . . . is the Court's recent, and unex-
plained, embrace of comparative and international law norms as aids to domestic constitu-
tional interpretation.")
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four hour news networks, and cellular phones. We are at a cross-
roads where we must decide whether or not to share mutually in
the jurisprudential wisdom around the globe, just as we are be-
ginning to share everything else.3 ° I believe this can be achieved
within the framework of a Constitution of unquestionable endur-
ance. Justice O'Connor's "transjudicialism" mirrors a process that
is evolving and enlarging daily, and the rest of the world expects
us to participate. But "perception is everything," according to an
old maxim, and though some might find the fears surrounding any
reliance on foreign law irrational, such fears must be dealt with. 3'
First, there is the ancient fear of the unknown, of change in
general, especially change that comes from without. The congres-
sional hearing described above communicated fears that precedent
will be ignored, and the Court will unexpectedly render decisions
based on some heretofore-unknown law. Worse, the law, imported
wholesale in a nightmare scenario, could come from a country not
entirely approved of by "the people."
As indicated above, reliance on foreign law is not new, and if
past performance is the strongest indicator of future conduct, we
have nothing to fear from this or any future court. And given that
the recent usage of foreign law has only been as a reference to in-
ternational consensus, the reliance has been quite limited indeed.
In fact, "reliance" is probably too strong a word to describe what
the Court has done with international law.
The judicial branch was designed in such a way as to prevent
quick changes of any kind. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
give a treatise on this aspect, but any constitutional scholar would
agree that decades pass easily between a dissenting opinion and
its eventual placement in the mainstream of jurisprudence. Bor-
rowing a metaphor from the realm of classical music, the progress
of judicial thinking since our founding resembles more of a "fugue"
130. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225, 1306 (1999).
It seems clear that interest in learning from experience elsewhere is part of the
wider phenomenon that goes under the cliched label globalization. Constitu-
tional experience in other nations has become relevant to U.S. legal culture be-
cause of the tighter connections between legal practice in the United States and
elsewhere that have developed in the past few decades.
Id. See also Mauro, supra note 15, at 2.
131. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, Comparative Constitutional-
ism and Opening Up the Conversation: "Proportionality," Rights, and Federalism, 1 U. PA.
J. CONST.L. 583 (1999).
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than the coda's sudden clash of cymbals. 132 Stare decisis has seen
to that.33
Contrary to Justice Scalia's view, some scholars see a great ad-
vantage to "comparative constitutionalism.""4 Tushnet argues
that in analyzing the experiences of other countries, we can gain
insight into the proper interpretation of our own Constitution:
The expressivist approach to comparative constitutional
law takes as its premise that comparative inquiry may
help us see our own practices in a new light and might
lead courts using non-comparative methods to results
they would not have reached had they not consulted the
comparative material. The license for analysis is not at
all distinctive to comparative approaches. Rather, it is
that judges of wide learning whether in comparative con-
stitutional law, in the classics of literature, in economics,
or in many other fields may see things about our society
that judges with a narrower vision miss .... In this as-
pect, comparative constitutional law operates in the way
that general liberal education does. To the extent that
we think that judges are licensed to rely on what they
take from great works of literature as they interpret the
Constitution, we should think that they are licensed to
rely on comparative constitutional law as well.'35
Tushnet also makes the point that judges engage in comparativ-
ism in any state issue where there is no case law on point, and
this kind of analysis could become common with regard to national
issues:
A few decades hence, constitutional lawyers may find it
as natural to invoke constitutional experience elsewhere
132. Fugue: "a composition in which a theme is introduced by one part, repeated by
other parts, and subjected to complex development." FUNK AND WAGNALL'S STANDARD
DICTIONARY 296 (2nd ed. 1993). Coda: "(music) a final passage." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 120 (Pocket ed. 1975).
133. Stare Decisis: "Latin, to stand by things decided; the doctrine of precedent, under
which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points
arise again in litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
134. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225 (1999) (The bibliography notes that "this article is an outgrowth of work done in con-
junction with the development of VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1999).") (Prof. Jackson testified at the Hear-
ing on H.R. 568, supra note 15).
135. Id. at 1236-37.
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in support of their arguments for interpretations of the
U.S. Constitution as today's lawyers arguing a tort case
in New York find it natural to invoke developments in
Michigan or California tort law to support their argu-
ments for what New York law should be.
1 36
It is telling that a scholar squarely against the Court using in-
ternational law for the original reasons recited above, i.e., the fear
of unexpected results, etc., offers only tepid advice in the form of
"limiting techniques," as opposed to impeachment, (as suggested
by the Republican Congress).137 For example, Larsen suggests lim-
iting the "world community" to "civilized counties," or "English-
speaking peoples," or some other pre-ordained grouping.13' Recog-
nizing problems inherent in such an approach, she acknowledges
that this would constitute "picking and choosing," criticized by
Justice Scalia in Roper.1
39
Her other suggestion is to have a policy of "one-way ratcheting,"
invoking international law "only to expand, rather than limit, pro-
tections of individual rights under domestic law.. 4 ° Since the de-
cisions under fire recently do just that, it is unlikely that this ap-
proach would be favored by the GOP. However, she concludes
that, because there is no current justification "that satisfies ... it
seems we are better off to abandon this particular use of foreign
and international law." 4' One might ask, who is not being satis-
fied? As Friedman asserts, counter-majoritarian criticism arises
only when decisions are seen as "more mutable and politically mo-
tivated."
142
Another argument offered against the use of international law
is the double-edged sword of "importing foreign laws;"143 i.e., loss of
sovereignty via loss of the non-execution of treaties, and violation
of the separation of powers. However, it must be said in rebuttal
136. Id. at 1306. Prof. Jackson makes this point at the Hearing on H.R. 568, supra note
15.
137. Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization:" Law-
rence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1322-26 (2004).
138. Id. at 1322-23 (pre-ordained, presumably, by the Court).
139. Id. at 1323.
140. Id. at 1325 (quoting Prof. Strossen's proposal).
141. Id. at 1327.
142. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, part one: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 333, 351 (1998). See also Mauro, supra note
15.
143. Statement of Congressman Feeney, supra note 92.
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that the Court is only filling an interpretive role. That is not to
say that ramifications of their decisions do not flow to the popu-
lace and take their place as a statute would, but there is a signifi-
cant brake inherent in the framework: the other branches of gov-
ernment have the option to employ the various checks and bal-
ances, (beyond the scope of this paper) at their disposal, inherent
in the Constitution. This, combined with stare decisis, makes it
quite unlikely that laws would ever be effectively imported whole-
sale from another country.
It is important to note that the Senate resolution to limit the
Supreme Court's interpretation threatens far greater damage to
the separation of powers.' Prof. Jackson warned the sub-
committee on the Constitution:
Efforts by the political branches to prescribe what prece-
dents and authorities can and cannot be considered by
the Court in interpreting the Constitution in cases prop-
erly before it would be inconsistent with our separation of
powers system. It could be seen both here and elsewhere
as an attack on the independence of the courts in per-
forming their core adjudicatory activities. Around the
world, the most widely emulated institution established
by the U.S. Constitution has been the provision for inde-
pendent courts to engage in judicial review of the consti-
tutionality of the acts of other branches and levels of gov-
ernment. Congress should be loath even to attempt to in-
trude on this judicial function, with respect to a practice
that dates back to the founding, and at a time when the
United States is deeply engaged in promoting democratic
constitutionalism in countries around the world, includ-
ing provision for independent courts to provide enforce-
ment of constitutional guarantees.4 '
Finally, the last great fear seems to be the subjectivity of the
Court in rendering decisions based on a perceived, unscientifically
measured national and international consensus. Described as
"picking and choosing," or selectively bolstering personal opinions
with international law, almost every decision the Court makes
could be criticized in much the same way. Short of programming a
144. The Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law:
Hearing on H.R. 568, 40, supra note 15 (Vicki C. Jackson, Prepared Statement).
145. Hearing on H.R. 568, 40.
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computer with constitutional parameters, what choice is there?
Justice Scalia seems to dislike any option but the legislature's
when it comes to decisions involving social issues. A "national
consensus" does not impress him, even if he could devise mathe-
matical proof of its existence. Similarly, opinion polls hold even
less regard. Since someone must make these difficult rulings, who
better than the most respected Jurists in the world? And if one
fears wholesale importation of another country's laws, where
would we be without the inherent selectivity of the Court? Justice
Frankfurter's eulogy with regard to the "judgment of the Court"
rings as true today as when he first delivered it.' 4
In the end, if the issue is really a socio-political one, Justice
Scalia's arguments that foreign law would have potential adverse
consequences with regard to the exclusionary rule, separation of
church and state, and abortion, appear to be red herrings. He
knows as well as anyone that it is extremely doubtful the Court
would adopt reasoning at extreme odds with current American
opinion or constitutional jurisprudence. As Wu opines, "Is some-
one as intellectually stubborn as Sandra Day O'Connor [or anyone
else on the Bench] realistically in danger of corruption by foreign
influence? Pas question.""7 Unfortunately, these red herrings do
what they are intended to do: raise the hackles of the constitu-
tionally-uninitiated, creating needless consternation that basic
rights will be lost. The ultimate threat is that our law will stag-
nate in its limited pool of jurisprudence, creating a kind of wall of
China about ourselves. Meanwhile, the rest of the world will en-
joy the economic and social progress of constitutional hybrids,
which can only be created through international intercourse.
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